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SONJA B. STARR

&

M . M A R I T R EH A V I

On Estimating Disparity and Inferring Causation:
Sur-Reply to the U.S. Sentencing Commission Staff
In this Essay, Professors Starr and Rehavi respond to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s empirical staff’s criticisms of their recent article, which found, contrary
to the Commission’s prior work, no evidence that racial disparity in sentences
increased in response to United States v. Booker. As Starr and Rehavi suggest, their
differences with the Commission perhaps relate to differing objectives. The
Commission staff’s reply expresses a lack of interest in identifying Booker’s causal
effects; in contrast, that is Starr and Rehavi’s central objective. In addition, Starr and
Rehavi’s approach also accounts for disparities arising throughout the post-arrest
justice process, extending beyond the Commission’s narrower focus on disparities in
adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines. Beyond these core disagreements, Starr and
Rehavi point to several ways in which the reply’s other criticisms inaccurately describe
their claims, their methods, and the scope of their study’s sample.
In our article, we examined the effects of United States v. Booker on racial
disparity throughout the federal criminal justice process, using a newly
constructed dataset that traces cases from arrest through sentencing.1 Using an
econometric method for causal inference, a regression discontinuity-style
design, we found no evidence that Booker or its progeny increased black-white
disparity in the sentences received by arrestees with the same arrest offense and
underlying characteristics. Nor did we find any substantial increases in
disparity in charging, plea-bargaining, or fact-finding. While our causal
analysis focused on Booker’s short-term effects, analyses of the longer-term
trend also showed that the sentence gap among otherwise-similar black and
white arrestees did not grow in the years following Booker. We therefore

1.

Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the
Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013).
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concluded that there is no evidence that racial disparity has increased since
Booker, much less because of it.
Our findings conflicted with the conclusions of two U.S. Sentencing
Commission reports. The Commission found that the sentence gap between
comparable black and white men had approximately quadrupled in the wake of
Booker and its progeny, implied that Booker’s expansion of judicial discretion
was the cause of that quadrupling (and of an increase in interdistrict disparity),
and accordingly proposed various legislative fixes to reimpose constraints on
judicial discretion. We critiqued the methods used by these reports as well as
other sentencing-disparity research. In particular, we argued that estimates of
sentence gaps should not use control variables that filter out the components of
those gaps that arise from decision-making earlier in the justice process. We
also argued that the Commission’s method of comparing the time periods
before and after Booker and its successors could not support causal inferences
about Booker’s effects, because it could not disentangle those effects from
background trends and events.
The Commission’s empirical staff members—the authors of the prior
reports—have now published a reply.2 We appreciate their taking the time to
engage with these issues, and also appreciate the Commission’s longstanding
efforts to understand sentencing disparities. We wholeheartedly agree that
racial disparities exist in the federal system and are troubling. However, we
believe that designing effective policies to address unwarranted disparities
requires rigorous identification of their causes, and we believe the
Commission’s approach falls short of this mark. Not everything that has
happened in sentencing since 2005 is the result of Booker. We also believe that
the potential sources of sentence disparity begin far earlier in the process than
the judge’s final sentencing decision, which is the focus of the Commission’s
analysis. Booker altered the legal landscape for prosecutors, defendants, and
judges, and one cannot get a complete picture of its effects on disparity by only
comparing pre- and post-Booker disparities in the last narrow slice of the
criminal justice process.
The reply unfortunately contains a number of mischaracterizations of our
findings and approach. For example, the reply repeatedly suggests, beginning
with its title, that we have claimed that judges don’t “matter at sentencing.”
But to the contrary, our method examines changes in judicial behavior far more
comprehensively than the Commission’s does, and also examines changes in
the behavior of other important actors who also matter. While the Commission
repeatedly claims that we have ignored the “reality of the actual sentencing

2.
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process,”3 and in particular that we have disregarded the legal and practical
importance of the determination of the Guidelines sentencing range, in fact it is
the Commission’s approach that effectively disregards the importance of that
process by excluding any disparities that arise in it from its ultimate sentence
disparity estimates. Our approach, by contrast, takes each stage in the justice
process seriously (including Guidelines fact-finding) by assessing Booker’s
effects on disparities in all of them, individually and in the aggregate. In short,
we do not ignore variables like the presumptive Guidelines sentence; we treat
them as outcomes to be analyzed, rather than controls to be filtered out.
In addition, the reply frequently appears to confuse the main results
presented in our article—our study of Booker’s effects—with our separate study
of federal charging disparities, which we briefly summarize and discuss in Part
II of our article. For example, the reply repeatedly alleges that we exclude drug
cases.4 This was true of many (but not all) of the analyses in our charging
study, but it is not true of the Booker study: the Booker study’s sample includes
all major case categories other than immigration, as the article makes clear. The
reply’s focus on the other study is curious, because it is the Booker study that
most directly relates to the Commission’s own reports. In its comparatively
limited discussion of Booker, the reply seems to retreat from the claim that the
Commission’s findings can be interpreted causally, and states that identifying
causation is unimportant.5 But without evidence that Booker caused an increase
in racial disparity, racial disparity does not justify policy proposals designed to
reverse Booker’s effects.
This sur-reply is organized in four parts. First, we briefly summarize our
study’s methods and findings. Second, we consider the reply’s critique of our
decision to explore disparities arising from earlier procedural stages rather than
only considering the sentencing stage in isolation. Third, we address the causal
inference issue and the criticisms of our regression discontinuity approach.
Fourth, we show that the reply’s criticisms pertaining to the definition of our
sample are unsound, and that several of them are simply inapplicable to the
sample used in this study.
i. our study of booker’s effects
The principal results reported in our article stem from a study of changes in
black-white racial disparities in federal cases, excluding immigration, during
the time period surrounding United States v. Booker. We constructed a unique

3.
4.
5.

Id. at 258; see also id. at 271-72.
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 269-71.
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dataset that combined records from four federal agencies, allowing us to trace
cases from arrest through sentencing. By controlling for arrest offense
characteristics and other prior traits (such as criminal history), we were able to
compare black and white arrestees whose cases looked similar when they
entered the federal justice system, and estimate the divergence of their fates at
each subsequent stage of the justice process as well as Booker’s effects on
disparities at all those stages. Because the pre-sentencing stages have crucial
consequences for the sentence,6 we believe that understanding them is essential
to assessing Booker’s impact on racial disparities in ultimate sentence outcomes.
Unlike the Commission’s alternate approach, which we discuss further below,
we therefore did not use control variables that filter out the share of the
sentence gap that arises from those earlier stages.
Our first cut of our data, presented in Table 1 of our article, was a
description of the long-term linear time trends in the black-white sentence gap
over the period from May 2003 through September 2009 (a period that directly
corresponded to the period during which the Sentencing Commission’s 2010
report had found that disparity among black and white males had more than
quadrupled, from 5.5% to 23%). Our assessment of these long-term trends did
not speak to Booker’s causal effects—as we explain below, it is dangerous to
attribute long-term trends to a single intervening event. Instead, this
estimation was simply designed to assess whether racial disparities for
comparable individuals arrested for the same offense did, in fact, grow during
the study period.
We found that they did not. Note that our claim is not that racial disparity
is not a problem, but rather that the problem has remained fairly stable in
scale. One only finds an upward trend in disparity if, like the Commission, one
focuses on the final slice of the justice process in isolation—excluding the
portions of the sentence gap that come from all of the earlier procedural stages.
We also found that black-white disparity in the Guidelines offense level (and
thus in the “presumptive sentence,” which is based on that offense level
combined with criminal history) declined during the same period, conditional
on the arrest offense and other prior traits. This change provides one plausible
explanation for the difference between our findings and the Commission’s.
The Commission is measuring sentence gaps relative to the presumptive
sentence, but if racial disparity in the presumptive sentence itself declines
(holding underlying conduct constant), a gap measured this way will appear to

6.
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This point is widely accepted by legal scholars, as discussed in Section II.A of our article,
and we provided empirical evidence for it in our separate study, which is discussed in Part II
of our Yale Law Journal article. See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in
Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences (Univ. of Mich. Program in Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 12-002, 2012) (under review), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985377.
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grow even if final sentences themselves are actually unchanged. This apparent
growth is an artifact of the Commission’s estimation strategy—it does not
mean that disparity actually got worse among defendants with similar
underlying conduct.
Next, we turned to the question of Booker’s causal effects on disparities at
each key stage of the process. The question whether Booker (and its progeny,
United States v. Gall and United States v. Kimbrough) caused changes in racial
disparity is quite different from the question whether racial disparity was larger
after those cases were decided. Many things change over time. If disparity
simply grew over time due to gradual background trends or events unrelated to
Booker, disparities would appear larger in the post-Booker and especially the
post-Gall/Kimbrough periods, just as the Commission found.
To assess Booker’s causal effects rigorously, we used a regression
discontinuity-style estimator (RD), which filters out background trends and
focuses on sharp breaks in disparity occurring immediately after Booker. We
applied this method to assess changes in each of the major procedural stages
(charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing) by exploiting the fact that criminal
cases have several key moments. We thus assessed changes in initial charging
(and their consequences for downstream outcomes, including the ultimate
sentence) by looking for sudden changes as the charging date passed Booker.
Similarly, we assessed changes in plea-bargaining and in sentencing (including
fact-finding) via analyses that turned on the dates of conviction and
sentencing, respectively. The specific results are detailed in our article
(including in Table 2) and will not be repeated here, but the upshot is that
there is no evidence that Booker caused increases in racial disparity in any aspect
of the judicial process.7 While our main analyses focused on Booker for reasons
explained in our article, we also found no notable changes in racial disparity in
the aftermath of Gall/Kimbrough.
Our article did not include an RD analysis that parallels the Commission’s
approach to estimating disparity—that is, one that assesses whether,
immediately after Booker, there were sharp changes in sentence disparities
when one controls for the presumptive sentence, the mandatory minimum, and
departure status. We still do not favor this method, but for comparative
purposes, we have now carried out an additional analysis that applies the RD
method detailed in our article, but uses a set of control variables closely
paralleling the Commission’s. Specifically, we repeated the regressions shown
in Table 2, Panel 3C of our article (estimating the prison sentence outcome by

7.

There appears to have been a one-month spike in racial disparity in the use of mandatory
minimum charges by prosecutors, but this effect seems to have been very short term, so we
do not give it serious weight. See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 58-65. Sentence outcomes
actually show a statistically significant reduction in cases sentenced after Booker. Id. at 67-71.
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sentencing date), but altered the control variables. We removed our arrestoffense controls and replaced them with the Guidelines offense level,8 the
mandatory minimum indicator, broad offense-category controls similar to the
Commission’s, and indicators for the existence of government-initiated
downward departures, other downward departures, and upward departures.
The results are shown in Table 1 and visually depicted in Figure 1 (which, like
the figures in our article, shows monthly averages for black and white residual
sentences after the portions explained by the controls are removed).
Table 1.

regression discontinuity analysis of booker’s effects on prison
outcomes
With Offense Level, Departure Status, and Mandatory Minimum Controls

Prison Sentence (in Months)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-3.282*

-4.156*

-3.722*

2.231†

(1.59)

(1.83)

(1.63)

(1.31)

Booker

-1.823

-3.6

-4.9

-15.06**

* Black Defendant

(3.75)

(4.18)

(4.16)

(3.84)

Number of Observations

57,244

38,372

57,244

38,372

Adjusted R-Squared

0.659

0.657

0.659

0.657

Degree of Polynomial

2nd

2nd

3rd

3rd

18

12

18

12

Booker

Window Around Booker

Standard errors clustered by race*sentencing month are in parentheses. All regressions
include separate black and white polynomials in the distance of the sentencing data from
Booker, along with controls for the presence of a mandatory minimum, the Guideline offense
level, criminal history, offense categories, age, gender, and citizenship, and indicators for
government-initiated departures, other downward departures, and upward departures.
†
p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01.

8.
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Because criminal history is already in our model, using the Guidelines offense level means
that the two determinants of the presumptive sentence are both in the model.
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Figure 1.

average prison sentences
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This additional analysis shows no increase in black-white sentencing
disparity in cases sentenced after Booker. Indeed, in all four specifications the
estimated change in disparity at Booker is negative, although this reduction is
significant and sizeable in only one of the four specifications.9 Figure 1 likewise
shows that while sentences (after controlling for these variables) fell overall
after Booker, this change affected black and white defendants approximately
equally. There is no discernible increase in disparity: the distance between the
white and black lines does not grow. The beginning of the fall in sentences for
white defendants actually appears to predate Booker. That is, even when one
estimates disparity the Commission’s way (but uses a proper method for causal
inference), Booker does not appear to have increased it.

9.

As detailed in our article, we carried out every regression discontinuity analysis using varied
functional forms (quadratic versus cubic) and time windows within which the functions
were modeled (twelve months before and after Booker versus eighteen months).
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ii. should sentence disparity estimates incorporate
multiple procedural sources?
The first fundamental difference between our approach and that of the
Commission’s reports (as well as other existing literature) pertains to the way
disparity is estimated. We control for the arrest offense and other prior
characteristics, while the Commission controls for a set of variables including
the “presumptive sentence” (the low end of the Guidelines range), the
mandatory minimum sentence, and indicators of whether and in what
direction the judge chose to depart from the Guidelines. Disparity estimates
using the Commission’s controls filter out disparities in charging, pleabargaining, sentencing fact-finding, and even the judge’s departure decision.
Once one has already controlled for the existence of a departure, its direction,
and the point from which the judge considers departing (the presumptive
sentence), disparities that remain presumably must mainly be driven by
disparities in departure magnitude and disparities in the choice of sentence
within the guidelines range.
The Commission’s approach reflects a very narrow definition of what
sources of disparity policymakers should care about when assessing Booker’s
effects. The choices made at the earlier procedural stages have sentencing
consequences, and the Commission’s estimates filter out those consequences.
Moreover, the variables the Commission controls for could have been changed
by Booker itself or by other trends and events in the years covered by the study.
If, for instance, prosecutors used mandatory minimums differently in the later
years, fact-finding changed, or judges departed more often, these control
variables would not have the same relationship to underlying criminal conduct
before and after Booker, and those changes might not affect black and white
defendants equally. This makes it difficult to compare estimates of sentence
disparity for the different time periods.
As our article discusses, what constitutes an appropriate method or control
depends upon the goal of the analysis. We are especially concerned with the
ultimate disparity in sentence outcomes for black and white offenders who had
similar criminal conduct, criminal history, and other prior traits—so those
characteristics are what we aim to control for, using arrest offense as the best
possible proxy for criminal conduct. We thus measure disparities arising at
each stage of the justice process, which could compound or offset one another.
We think the objective of equal treatment generally demands a process-wide
approach, because sentence inequalities for similar offenders are troubling
whether they arise in charging, plea-bargaining, fact-finding, departure
decisions, or the ultimate choice of sentence.
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And indeed, this point was eloquently stated by the Sentencing
Commission itself in a report it released in 2004, the year before Booker.10 In
that report, the Commission carefully explained the serious limitations of an
approach to sentence-disparity analysis that focused only on disparities in the
final sentencing decision “in isolation.”11 It cited “a variety of evidence,”
including surveys and qualitative studies, suggesting “that disparate treatment
of similar offenders is common at presentencing stages.”12 The report
concluded that such earlier-stage disparities would have important sentencing
consequences, especially in light of the presumptive Guidelines system that
then existed, under which “there is little a judge can do to compensate” for
charging disparities.13 The Commission explained that it focused only on
sentencing (using the presumptive sentence approach) only because of
limitations in its data, which did not cover the earlier stages in the process.14 Its
approach thus by necessity defined “uniformity” in a very specific, limited way:
“similar treatment of offenders who appear to be similar[] based on the
charges of conviction and the facts established at the sentencing hearing.”15 The
Commission forthrightly acknowledged that “uniformity” in this narrow sense
was not all that one might aspire to: “Achievement of the more ambitious goal
of similar treatment of offenders who engage in similar real offense conduct
will also depend on uniform treatment at presentencing stages.”16
Because we now have the data the Commission lacked, our research has
been able to fill the need for a broader approach that the Commission so
effectively pointed out in 2004. Perhaps the Commission’s perspective on what
disparities matter has changed over time. In fairness, that perspective might
properly be different from ours, because the Commission is an institution
tasked with creating the Sentencing Guidelines and encouraging judges to use
them; there are reasons for it to focus on disparities in judges’ divergence from
the Guidelines. The question is whether this is the relevant disparity for

10. PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 81-92 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov
/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/15_year_study
_full.pdf.
11. Id. at 81.
12. Id. at 92; see also id. at 85-92 (detailing the evidence).
13. Id. at 92.
14. Id.; see id. at 88 (observing that research on presentencing disparities was hampered by lack
of arrest and prosecution-stage data). We note that when this report was written in 2004,
the linking files that we used to build our multi-agency dataset were not yet available.
15. Id. at 92.
16. Id.
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Congress or other decision-makers to consider, given that they do not
necessarily share the Commission’s institutional focus. We do not claim that
studies focusing only on judicial sentencing-choice disparities tell us nothing
useful—this stage is an important part of the process. But as other researchers
using such approaches have often acknowledged,17 they provide only a piece of
the picture of criminal justice disparities. Our work complements such studies
by offering a more complete view, allowing policymakers to assess Booker’s
effects across the justice process.
But even if, like the Commission, one is particularly interested in
disparities in Guidelines compliance, it is problematic to control for the
existence and direction of a Guidelines departure (or variance). The decision
whether to sentence outside the Guidelines at all is likely to be just as
important a source of disparity in Guidelines compliance as the decision of how
far outside the Guidelines to go. The use of the departure controls is especially
a problem for a study assessing Booker’s effects. Booker legally authorized
Guidelines departures that would not otherwise have been permitted, and its
one unambiguous, large effect on sentencing practice was that it caused a
dramatic, immediate increase in departure rates.18 A study cannot assess
Booker’s effects, even on sentencing relative to the Guidelines, if it filters out
the aspect of the sentencing decision that Booker changed most dramatically.19
The reply states that our study “ignore[s] the process judges actually
use,”20 that it is not “based on the reality of the sentencing process,”21 that we
“disregard the presumptive sentence,”22 and that we “omit consideration of the

17. E.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the
U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 288-89 (2001); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex
Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judge Demographics, 34 J. LEG. STUD.
57, 70-71 (2005); Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan
Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
1077, 1108 (2011); Supriya Sarnikar et al., Do You Receive a Lighter Sentence Because You Are a
Woman? An Economic Analysis of Federal Criminal Sentencing Guidelines 32 (Inst. for the
Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 2870, 2007).
18. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 54 fig.1.
19. The reply observes that “racial differences between Black males and White males increase
significantly” if one does not control for departure status. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 259.
But this observation merely illustrates the importance of departure status as a potential
disparity source, which is exactly why it should not be used as a control when assessing
Booker’s effects. The key question for this exercise is not how large the disparity is, but
whether and how much it changed after Booker and Gall/Kimbrough. The Commission does
not mention how taking this control away would affect its estimates of the change in
disparity.
20. Id. at 256.
21. Id. at 272.
22. Id. at 257.
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sentencing guidelines.”23 With respect, the opposite is true. We fully agree that
the determination of the Guidelines range, as required by law, is a crucial part
of the sentencing process. This is precisely why we believe that estimates of
sentence disparity should include racial disparities that arise in the processes
that determine the Guidelines range (which include both plea-bargaining and
judicial fact-finding). In contrast, including the presumptive sentence in the
regression, as the Commission favors, means that disparities in the sentence
that result from those processes are excluded from the racial disparity estimate.
Likewise, controlling for the mandatory minimum and departure status
excludes the portion of sentencing disparity that comes from the processes that
determine the mandatory minimum and from the judge’s decision whether to
depart.
The reply contests this point, stating: “Rather than ‘filtering out’ a key part
of the sentencing decision, as Starr and Rehavi assert, our model controls for
the different steps in the process.”24 This comment risks confusing readers as
to what a control variable does. Control variables filter things out: specifically,
they remove from the estimate of racial disparity in the sentence the
component of that disparity that is explainable by the controls.25 It is not
always better to control for more factors—especially not factors that are
actually part of the phenomenon you are interested in measuring.26
In contrast to the Commission’s narrow approach, our estimates of total
black-white sentence disparity incorporate the sentencing consequences of all
of the post-arrest steps in the process. However, not all of our analyses
aggregate these steps. Table 2 of our article also shows separate analyses of
Booker’s effects on the individual steps in the process, showing, for instance, its
effects on disparities in the final Guidelines offense level, in departure rates,
and in mandatory minimum charging and conviction rates. Our results also

23. Id.
24. Id. at 258.
25. For a general overview of the function of control variables in regression, see, for example,
JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 78-79
(4th ed. 2009) (explaining that the coefficient on the variable x1 in a regression that also
includes control variables x2 through xk “measures the effect of x1 on y after x2 [through] xk
have been partialled or netted out”); see also JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE,
MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 35 (2009) (explaining
that “each coefficient in a multivariate regression is the bivariate slope coefficient for the
corresponding regressor after partialing out all the other covariates”).
26. For a useful introduction to the problem of “bad controls,” see ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra
note 25, at 64-67 (“Some variables are bad controls and should not be included in a
regression model even when their inclusion might be expected to change the short
regression coefficients. Bad controls are variables that are themselves outcome variables in
the notional experiment at hand.”).
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excluded government-initiated departures (but, as we pointed out, would have
been the same had we included them), addressing another of the
Commission’s concerns.27
Contrary to the reply’s assertions, we do not suggest that judges do not
“matter at sentencing.”28 We do not embrace any “notion that judging in the
federal system is limited largely to picking a sentence from a table after adding
up a numerical score.”29 Nor do we doubt that “judges are very concerned with
determining the fair sentence and assess all of the evidence presented to them
with a discerning eye”—although the parties do shape what evidence is
presented to the judge.30 Moreover, although the importance of prosecutorial
decision-making was one motivation for our research, we do not assume that
“prosecutors alone principally determine the sentences imposed.”31 Indeed,
unlike the Commission, we assume nothing about which of the post-arrest
justice stages are the most important—that is why we study Booker’s effects on
all of them. And far from ignoring judges, our approach more effectively
captures judges’ sentencing-stage contributions to disparity because our
estimates incorporate differences in departure rates and sentencing factfinding. The Commission’s approach, in contrast, filters out those differences,
narrowly focusing on a small slice even of what judges do.
Finally, the reply sets forth some limitations of our key control variable, the
arrest offense.32 We do not claim that the arrest offense is a perfect proxy for
conduct, nor that the presumptive sentence never captures nuances in conduct
that the arrest offense misses.33 We pointed out these same limitations in our

Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 67.
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 251.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. Note that we also do not “disregard the influence of the defense community.” Id. To the
contrary, any disparities potentially produced by counsel treating black and white
defendants differently at any stage of the process would be included in our estimates of
disparities arising at those stages. The Commission’s approach, in contrast, effectively filters
out most defense influence as well as most prosecutorial influence on disparities.
32. Id. at 262-63.
33. The reply asserts that the presumptive sentence “provides a nuanced estimate” of the
defendant’s conduct, “determined by the sentencing judge after considering the evidence
presented by both parties.” Id. at 258. While this is no doubt often true, the presumptive
sentence is not a neutral snapshot of conduct that is immune from the possible effects of
procedural disparities. Even a “nuanced estimate” involves the judge’s discretionary,
subjective evaluations of the evidence, and there is no reason to assume this process is less
subject to disparities than departure decisions are. Moreover, fact-finding is only a partially
judge-driven process. The parties can influence the Guidelines sentence through factual
stipulations as well as agreements that shape the evidence introduced at sentencing, and a
survey of federal judges found that they overwhelmingly say that in cases in which the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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article, and explained why we nonetheless believe the arrest data provide, on
balance, better information for our purposes about underlying conduct than
the presumptive sentence does.34 The article also explains that the hundreds of
arrest offense codes provide far richer data on crime type than the
Commission’s seven broad categories do.35 We will not repeat these analyses
here.
But one point worth emphasizing is that none of the arrest data’s
limitations particularly matter for the purpose of our analysis of Booker’s
effects. A major advantage of RD is that, unlike basic regression, it does not
depend on the assumption that one has successfully observed and controlled
for all of the differences that could confound the underlying disparity
estimates. This is because the objective of the analysis is to estimate the change
in disparity at Booker—not the underlying level of disparity—and that change
can be validly estimated even if there are omitted variables. The assumption
underlying our RD analysis is simply that cases immediately on either side of
the discontinuity were comparable with respect to any omitted differences.36
Put another way, even if the model omits differences between black and white
cases, the discontinuity estimate will not be biased so long as the relative

parties have stipulated to the relevant facts, they usually or always defer to those
stipulations. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY 10
(1997), https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/gssurvey.pdf. And the presumptive
sentence is also constrained by mandatory minimums, the application of which turns
heavily on prosecutorial discretion.
34. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 58-71.
35. Id. at 24. The reply responds to this point with the non sequitur that our tables do not report
the statistic R-squared, a linear fit measure for the overall model that has nothing to do with
whether a model accurately estimates the true effect of any particular factor like crime type.
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 260. The fact that variables in the model are collectively good
predictors of the sentence (which is what R-squared speaks to) does not mean that they
accurately or precisely capture underlying conduct. See JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON,
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 234 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining that R-squared is not an
indicator of whether the choice of the regressors is correct). The objective of this model is
not to predict every sentence precisely; it is to test for a change in the role of race in
determining sentences at Booker. A model that includes the presumptive sentence as well as
departure status and the mandatory minimum will obviously do an excellent job of
predicting the sentence. Hence the Commission’s model has a very high R-squared. But it
achieves this predictive power at the expense of controlling for too much, filtering out from
the racial disparity estimate many of its key procedural sources. Note that the adjusted Rsquared values for our prison sentence regressions vary slightly across the models shown,
ranging from approximately 0.33 to 0.36.
36. Because schedules are set in advance while the exact timing of the Court’s decision was not
known in advance, the placement of cases just before versus just after the discontinuity was
effectively random. The article discusses this assumption in much more detail, including
analyzing whether there is any evidence of timing manipulation.
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underlying, unobserved severity of black and white cases did not suddenly
change at Booker. Take, for instance, the possibility that loss amounts in fraud
cases vary by race, a difference our arrest codes cannot capture.37 So long as the
relative loss amounts involved in black versus white defendants’ cases do not
suddenly change, breaking from ongoing trends, in the vicinity of Booker, the
estimates for Booker’s effects on racial disparity in sentencing and other
outcomes would be unaffected.
Control variables serve a different function in regression discontinuity
design than they do in basic regression analyses like the Commission’s—in RD
they mainly absorb noise. If the control variables do not suddenly change in
the vicinity of the discontinuity, the RD estimates should be approximately the
same whether or not they are included.38 And indeed, we ran all our RD
analyses with and without controls and got similar estimates. This is because
there is no reason to believe that the underlying pools of cases resulting in
federal arrests, or the Marshals Service’s coding of those cases, changed
suddenly right around Booker, much less in racially disparate ways. In contrast,
it would be problematic to include in the RD analysis control variables that
could be affected in the short term by Booker itself, and thus it is important that
we do not control for the presumptive sentence, departure status, or
mandatory minimum. Instead, we conduct separate RD analyses of each of
these as outcome variables, to investigate whether they were affected by Booker.
iii. the reply’s comments on our booker analysis
The objective of our article was to evaluate the causal effects of Booker on
racial disparity. The reply suggests that the Commission had a different
objective, seemingly backing away from a causal interpretation of the
Commission’s findings. Indeed, it suggests that causal identification is not
important:
We do not think it important to say (or to disprove) that Booker, or
Kimbrough and Gall, alone caused the differences we find. Rather, we
think it is more important to note that demographic differences in
sentences existed to a much larger extent after those decisions than

37. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 262; Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 33. Note that assessment
of the Sentencing Commission’s fact-finding data for our sample does not indicate any
significant racial disparities in loss amount findings—nor, for that matter, in conspiracy-role
findings.
38. Guido W. Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice,
142 J. ECONOMETRICS 615, 626-27 (2008).
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immediately before them and that policymakers, judges, and the
Commission should consider this fact.39
We respectfully disagree. Causal identification is important in order for
policymakers, judges, and the Commission to know what to make of
disparities, and to inform their decisions about what solutions, if any, to
pursue. Even if disparities did exist to a much larger extent after Booker and its
progeny, if the court decisions did not cause the growth in disparity, then
disparity would not be a reason to adopt policy measures paring back Booker’s
effects on judicial discretion. The Commission itself titled its 2012 Report
“Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal
Sentencing,” implying a causal connection, and that report contains policy
recommendations that are premised on the notion that there is a Booker
problem that needs to be fixed. Our RD analyses showed that, at least where
racial disparity is concerned, there is no evidence that Booker created a problem.
As Section III.A of our article detailed, the Commission’s approach does
not yield valid causal inferences about Booker’s effects. Its method is to
compare the estimates from separate regressions conducted on sets of cases
from several separate time periods—most notably, the periods from the
PROTECT Act to Booker, from Booker to Gall/Kimbrough, and the postGall/Kimbrough period. Because the “black” coefficient is smallest in the first
(5.5%) of these three periods and largest in the last (19.5%), the Commission
implies that disparity increased in response to Booker and its progeny.40
However, one cannot safely attribute differences in the average disparities
measured in these broad time periods to a single intervening legal event. Many
things can change over time, any of which could explain these results.
Differences between the periods before and after an event do not necessarily
result from the event. It is colder in North America during the two months
after December 25 than during the preceding two months, but one cannot
therefore infer that the exchange of Christmas gifts by many families caused
winter. Similarly, racial disparity as the Commission measures it could have
been higher in the later time periods for reasons unrelated to Booker. For
example, even if judicial behavior did not noticeably change, the composition
of the pools of cases in the three periods might have been different, with the

39. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 271.
40. Note that beyond the problem of causal inference from change across such broad time
periods, another problem with the Commission’s approach of comparing estimates across
separate regressions is that the effects of the control variables are not held constant across
regressions.
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later pools involving more cases with characteristics that tend to produce
greater racial disparity.41
Moreover, another serious threat to causal inference is the possibility that
the presumptive sentence and the problematic control variables might have
changed in response to Booker, or otherwise changed over time, in ways that
are not explained by changes in underlying criminal conduct. For instance, if
fact-finding disparities were declining over the period (as Table 1 of our article
suggests), the presumptive sentence control might effectively mean something
different in the later time periods than it did in the earlier time periods, relative
to underlying conduct. This would mean that racial disparity estimates that
condition on the presumptive sentence could not fairly be compared across
time periods—the presumptive sentence has become a different “yardstick” for
measuring the severity of conduct.42
In response to these criticisms, the reply offers a description of a new
analysis that its authors conducted, which replicates the Commission’s separate
regressions but reduces the time periods being compared to three six-month
periods: just before Blakely v. Washington, between Blakely and Booker, and
after Booker. The reply states that disparity increased from each period to the
next, although the size of the increase is not stated. This reduction of the time
periods’ length is a welcome modification, but this new analysis does not
resolve the causal inference concerns. The shorter periods do not solve the
problem that the presumptive sentence or other control variables could have
been affected by Booker (or Blakely), creating a “changing yardstick” problem.
Moreover, the eighteen-month period on which this new analysis focuses,
while less problematic than the original, longer periods, is still long enough
that background trends or other events could confound the results. Our
regression discontinuity approach, in contrast, controls for those background
trends so that it can separately identify sharp breaks in the trends.43
In addition, the findings of the reply’s new analysis do not actually seem to
support the conclusion that Booker increased disparity. The reply finds that the
increase in disparity (as the Commission measures it) began before Booker, in
the period surrounding Blakely.44 The reply contends that these new findings
show that “the impact of Booker . . . may have begun even before the date of

41. As we discuss further in Part III below, one candidate for such a change is the major
expansion in the immigration docket.
42. For a fuller treatment of this “changing yardstick” problem, see Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1,
at 40-48.
43. The new analysis also still amounts to comparisons across separate time periods, without
holding the control variables constant across the time periods as one would if the periods
were combined in a single “differences-in-differences” analysis.
44. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 270.
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that decision,” namely, with “the decision in Blakely, a case with a holding very
similar to Booker but which applied only to state court cases.”45 The implication
of this argument is that the post-Booker sentencing-procedure regime, on
which the Commission blames the increase in disparity, actually began not
with Booker but with Blakely. But this interpretation is implausible. While
Blakely’s Sixth Amendment holding was indeed similar to Booker’s, its remedy
was not; it did not loosen constraints on judicial discretion. No circuit adopted
a Booker-like remedy during the period between Blakely and Booker, and the
Guidelines remained mandatory in every federal court. Nor did district courts
begin acting as though their discretion had expanded. As shown in Figure 1 of
our article, there was no rise in departure rates after Blakely—until Booker,
when they immediately spiked.
Blakely might well have changed the incentives and actions of the parties,
and in some courts it likely changed fact-finding, because certain circuits began
to require aggravating facts to be proven to juries. These possibilities are the
reason we confined our Booker analysis to the “business as usual” circuits and
carried out other assessments of Blakely’s effects. But the Commission’s
measure of disparity does not focus on the parties, nor on fact-finding; it
focuses only on judicial sentencing relative to the Guidelines. The increased
disparity it finds before Booker cannot be attributed to judges’ expanded
discretion, because that discretion did not expand until Booker was decided.46
Instead, the Commission’s new analysis is consistent with the theory that the
increased disparity it found after Booker was the result of an unrelated
background trend.
In contrast to the Commission’s methods, our regression discontinuitystyle approach is a rigorous method for estimating causal effects, and provides
no evidence that Booker increased disparity. The reply critiques our focus on
Booker’s short-term effects, attributing to us the straw-man position “that the
full impact of Booker would be seen in the weeks or months immediately after
Booker.”47 Our article makes clear that we do not believe this is true, but also
explains that it does not need to be true for regression discontinuity analysis to

45. Id. at 270-71.
46. If Blakely (and not some unrelated background trend) is indeed responsible for increased
disparity as the Commission measures it, it is most likely because it changed the parties’
behavior or changed fact-finding, and thereby changed the relationship of the Commission’s
control variables to underlying criminal conduct. The apparent increase in sentence
disparity relative to the presumptive sentence might, as we showed with the long-term
trends in Table 1 of our article, really be a result of reduced disparity in the presumptive
sentence, not increased disparity in sentencing.
47. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 269.
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nonetheless tell us something important about Booker’s causal effects.48 It is not
that we should expect Booker’s full effects to have been seen right away—it is
that, if one is to infer that Booker dramatically increased racial disparity, one
should expect to see some of that effect immediately after Booker. After all,
Booker did have a dramatic, immediate, discontinuous effect on judges’
willingness to depart from the Guidelines.49 If judges used their newfound
departure authority in ways that disproportionately benefited white defendants
or harmed black defendants, one would expect at least some of that disparate
effect to appear fairly quickly, given that they started using that authority right
away. But it did not. Nor, for that matter, were there any sudden increases in
disparity after Kimbrough and Gall.50 Moreover, our estimation of the longterm trend also failed to find an increase in disparity.
Of course, as we observe in our article, it would be wonderful if Booker’s
long-term causal effects could also be analyzed in a rigorous way.
Unfortunately, this is not possible. The methods the Sentencing Commission
uses cannot do it, and we are pleased that the reply essentially acknowledges
this point.51 Too many things change over time. The best that can be done is to
assess the short-term causal effects using RD—and the RD analyses do not
find an increase in disparity. Moreover, again, our analysis of the long-term
trends (which we do not claim are causally linked to Booker) also fails to find an
increase in disparity, and, if anything, suggests a decline.
iv. our sample
The reply repeatedly criticizes our study’s sample, contending that it
represents only a narrow subset of federal cases during the relevant period.
First, it is false that our sample excludes drug cases,52 or that it otherwise
consists of a narrow subset of crimes.53 As our article clearly states, the sample

48. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 8-9, 49-52.
49. Id. at 54 fig.1.
50. As described in our article, we did not focus our main analysis on these cases because, unlike
Booker, they did not involve sharp changes in judicial departure behavior nor did they
constitute dramatic changes in the law, so one would not really have expected sudden
changes in disparity either.
51. See Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 271.
52. Id. at 266-67.
53. We are not sure where the reply’s specific claim that our sample includes only “twenty
percent” of cases during the study period comes from. Id. at 254, 264. The sample does
exclude immigration and identity theft, but otherwise includes all black and white offenders.
The Booker RD analysis excludes certain circuits because of the Blakely complication, as
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for the RD analysis “includes all non-immigration cases except identity theft,
which was subject to other major sentencing-law changes very near Booker.”54
Notwithstanding the article’s repeated clarifications of this point,55 the authors
appear to be confusing our article’s study of Booker with the separate study of
charging disparities that we summarized in Part II; that study had excluded
drug cases from some, but not all, of the analyses, and the alternative analyses
that did include them found similar disparity patterns.56 Likewise, the Booker
explained above and in the article, but results were substantively similar when they were
included.
54. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 53; see also id. at 59 (noting that the RD method allowed
analysis of charging changes in “all case types”).
55. See id. at 7 n.13 (“The charging study’s analysis of drug cases is somewhat more limited. In
contrast, this Article’s study of Booker includes drug cases in all its analyses.” (citation
omitted)); id. at 30 n.93 (“In its recent report, the Sentencing Commission criticizes [the
charging study] for excluding drug trafficking cases but makes no mention of the additional
analyses showing that the results are similar in those cases. Note, in any event, that the
Booker analysis, infra Part III, which is a more direct counterpoint to the Commission’s
Booker report, uses a broader sample that includes these cases.” (citation omitted)); see also
id. at 5-6 n.9 (citing the working paper version of the charging study and explaining more
generally the differences between the two studies).
56. See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 6, at 7-8 (discussing the reasons for the exclusion and the
alternative analyses). The reply offers some confused critiques of these additional analyses
from the charging study. Contrary to the reply’s suggestion, the charging study’s analysis of
drug and child pornography cases never uses the “additional charge variable . . . that [we]
had earlier explained . . . involved ‘ambiguities.’” Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 267. Instead,
we assessed the extent to which otherwise-unexplained sentencing disparities could be
explained by the final mandatory minimum recorded at sentencing, which is recorded for all
cases. The reply then suggests that our willingness “to use sentencing data” reveals an
inconsistency, because we critique the Commission and other researchers for doing so. Id.
But we have never claimed that sentencing data is unreliable or should never be used for any
purpose. The decomposition uses that data to identify the share of the total unexplained gap
that appears to be attributable to the mandatory minimum, which is appropriate; unlike the
Commission, however, we do not control for the mandatory minimum when we estimate
the size of that total unexplained gap in the first place.
The reply also alleges that we do not explain the specifics of this analysis, such as
whether we could control for drug type and quantity. Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 265 n.55.
The brief summary of our other study included in our article indeed did not go into detail,
but as we explain in Rehavi & Starr, supra note 6, at 21 n.40, drug type seized at arrest is
included in all analyses of drug cases. Drug quantity seized at arrest is only reliably available
before 2004 and is not included in the primary analysis, but we repeated our analyses during
the years 2001-2003 adding quantity controls, and found the results robust to this addition.
Meanwhile, our Yale Law Journal article’s analysis of Booker’s effects does not include drug
quantity controls, but the RD-style approach makes this omission extremely unlikely to bias
the results. The omission would only affect the Booker results if the distribution of drug
quantities seized at arrest happened to change suddenly and in racially disparate ways in the
immediate vicinity of Booker. This would seem an unlikely coincidence, and qualitative
research on drug enforcement during this period finds no evidence that suggests such a
sudden change. Furthermore, because the length of elapsed time between arrest and
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study is obviously not limited to “data only from fiscal years 2007 to 2009.”57
Nor does the Booker study exclude non-U.S. citizens, contrary to the reply’s
claim.58
It is true that we include Hispanic offenders in the black and white groups
in some of our analyses.59 Hispanic persons can identify with various racial
groups, and there is no reason that disparities between black and white
Hispanics should not count as black-white racial disparity. In any event,
however, the results of our RD analysis, as we explained in the article, were
unchanged if we instead exclude Hispanic defendants, focusing on the gap
between non-Hispanic white and black defendants.60 Our analysis of the longterm trends from 2003 through 2009 (Table 1 of our article) was designed to
track the Sentencing Commission’s sample as closely as possible, except for the
exclusion of immigration cases. It therefore excluded Hispanic defendants and
focused only on black and white non-Hispanic men.61 When Hispanic
defendants are included instead, estimates of the decline in disparity over that
period are somewhat larger and statistically significant, as our article
explains.62
The one truly substantial difference between our sample and the
Commission’s concerns immigration cases. Immigration cases are a big part of
the federal docket (although they are, in fact, quite a small part of the blackwhite incarceration disparity picture).63 But there are good reasons that we,
like many other researchers, excluded them. First, changes in immigration
cases could very well be an example of a strong background trend during the
study period that confounds the Commission’s results. While the volume of
non-immigration cases was fairly stable, the number of immigration arrests

57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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conviction or sentencing varies, even if arrest patterns had changed in some sudden way
before Booker, there should be no discontinuous effect on convictions or sentences entered
immediately after Booker.
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 265.
Compare id. at 268, with Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 53 (explaining that non-citizens are
included and that results would have been similar had they been excluded). The charging
study, in contrast, did exclude non-citizens from the main analysis, but it explains that its
results are unchanged when they are included. Rehavi & Starr, supra note 6, at 13, 21.
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 268-69.
Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 53 n.166
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 46 n.149.
According to the Sentencing Commission’s data from the year of Booker, less than two
percent of immigration defendants were black, and less than three percent of black
defendants were sentenced on immigration charges. Meanwhile, immigration sentences are
typically short, so immigration cases constitute an even smaller share of the black federal
prison population.
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recorded in the Marshals Service database more than tripled from 2003 to
2009, from approximately 25,000 to approximately 85,000. The number of
sentenced immigration defendants in the Sentencing Commission’s dataset
also increased substantially, but not quite as dramatically, from approximately
14,000 to approximately 24,000. Thus, at least two changes seem to have been
underway during that period. First, there was an explosion in the immigration
caseload. Second, there were also very likely changes in the way many of the
cases were being processed, such that many more cases did not proceed to
sentencing on a non-petty offense at all, or at least were greatly delayed such
that they did not do so within the studied time period. If one is attempting to
assess Booker’s effects by looking at changes across a time period, it is risky to
include a huge category of cases that was so transformed during that period.
Indeed, if disparities are higher when immigration cases are included than
when they are not (as an alternative analysis by Jeffrey Ulmer, Michael Light,
and John Kramer concluded),64 the growth in immigration’s share of the
federal caseload during the Commission’s study period could explain why the
Commission observed higher disparities in the later periods. But that
explanation is not related to Booker. It is an example of the type of unrelated
trend that the Commission’s method cannot rule out.
Second, immigration cases differ from other cases both procedurally (they
are often subject to fast-track processing) and substantively: for almost all
offenders, their stakes turn in substantial part on deportation. The reply is
correct that most immigration offenders also serve a short prison sentence.65
But deportation is inarguably a critical part of the outcome for most offenders,
and to compare the severity of outcomes in immigration cases on the basis of
incarceration alone is potentially misleading.
The Commission also observes that our sample lost some cases due to
inability to link them across agencies.66 This is true, but link rates at every
stage were quite high,67 and we conducted analyses that found no racial
disparities in link rates, suggesting little reason to believe that the algorithm’s

64.
65.
66.
67.

Ulmer et al., supra note 17, at 1098.
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 268.
Id. at 261-62.
The reply states that we “were able to match only sixty-eight percent of the cases.” Id. at 261.
We are not certain where this figure came from; it does not appear in our work. But we note
that many of the non-linking cases that the Commission may be referring to were not
algorithm failures, but were cases in which the case’s disposition meant that it was simply
not handled by the next agency in the chain—for instance, cases never referred to the U.S.
Attorney’s office, cases declined by prosecutors, cases handled as petty offenses by
magistrates, and cases that were dismissed. Such cases would not be included in the
Sentencing Commission’s dataset either. The link rates are further discussed in Rehavi &
Starr, supra note 6, Data App.
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imperfections biased the results. We also conducted analyses of Booker’s effects
on racial disparities in the rate at which non-petty charges are brought and the
rate at which such cases result in conviction, finding none. These analyses were
important in order to assess the possibility of sample selection bias, because
conviction on a non-petty charge is necessary for a case to make it into the
Sentencing Commission’s data. The Commission’s analysis is equally
susceptible to these sources of sample selection bias, and yet the Commission
did not (and could not, in the absence of other agencies’ data) carry out any
analyses of whether the subset of cases that made it into their dataset varied
across the different time periods. Indeed, the immigration figures cited above
strongly suggest that it did.68
conclusion
We stand by our conclusion that there is no evidence that Booker and its
progeny increased disparity in the sentences of comparable black and white
offenders. The Commission’s empirical staff indicate in their reply that causal
inference was not the goal of their study; it was, however, the goal of ours. And
our regression discontinuity analysis shows no evidence that Booker caused
substantial changes in the sentences received by black and white arrestees with
comparable arrest offenses and characteristics, nor does it show any clear
evidence that Booker caused an increase in disparity in any specific stage of the
judicial process. Moreover, longer-term analysis shows that in the years
surrounding Booker, there was no increase (there was possibly a slight decline)
in sentence disparity for comparable black and white arrestees. The
Commission’s contrary findings appear to be driven not by changes in
sentencing, but by a trend of declining disparity in its key control variable, the
presumptive sentence, along with other potential confounders. This point
illustrates the wisdom of the warning the Commission itself issued back in
2004: analyzing sentencing disparity in isolation from other parts of the justice
process risks missing an important part of the picture.
We do not wish to minimize the concern of racial disparity in the justice
process. Indeed, our work has emphasized the importance of this concern,
exploring prosecutorial charging discretion as an important mechanism behind
racial disparity. But the problem, while persistent, does not appear to be
growing, nor does it appear to be the result of expanding judicial discretion.

68. The reply observes that we “have not made [our] data available for further analysis.”
Schmitt et al., supra note 2, at 261 n.43. As the authors are surely aware, we are prohibited
from directly sharing restricted federal data, but the Sentencing Commission has ready
access to all the data we have (including the multi-agency linking files), which come from
the Commission itself and other federal agencies and are also available to other researchers.
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And if expansions of judicial discretion did not cause an increase in disparity,
re-imposing constraints on that discretion may not be a solution.
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